JCPOA
Pulling out of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018 is one of the most irresponsible things Donald Trump did in his time in office. First of all, leaving the deal made the United States look completely unreliable and put us at odds, yet again, with our European allies. We looked like total amateurs. But, far worse, it made the entire world much more unstable and vulnerable.
The JCPOA was an agreement between Iran and Britain, China, the European Union, France, Germany, Russia and the United States. From the beginning, Donald Trump had a huge issue with the deal, saying things like (remember, this is a direct quote hence the discombobulated wording), “We gave them $150 billion and $1.8 billion and we got nothing...look at what they did to John Kerry and to President Obama. Look what happened, where they’re bringing planeloads of cash, planeloads, big planes, 757s, Boeing 757s coming in loaded up with cash. What kind of a deal is that?”
This is a complete distortion of what actually happened. When the JCPOA was signed, Iran regained access to its own assets that have been frozen. It’s true that around $1.8 billion was paid to Iran from the U.S. Treasury — and did arrive in Tehran on a cargo plane, in cash — but that was money that the United States already owed Iran (Iran had paid us for military equipment that never was delivered). Still, even if you disagree with these decisions by the Obama administration, it had already happened. The money had already been paid, so why in the world would you blow everything up after the most controversial, hard-to-swallow part of the deal was already in our rearview?
The JCPOA was far from perfect, but the agreement achieved a huge goal: The Iranian government agreed to cut its stockpile to no more than 300kg of low-enriched uranium; promised that it would not enrich any uranium beyond 4 percent and that it would have only one enrichment facility; and, most importantly, Iran agreed to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency access to its nuclear facilities to verify its compliance.
Iran was complying with the deal. In May 2018, the month the Trump administration pulled us out, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released this statement: “The IAEA is closely following developments related to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As requested by the United Nations Security Council and authorized by the IAEA Board of Governors in 2015, the IAEA is verifying and monitoring Iran’s implementation of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA. Iran is subject to the world’s most robust nuclear verification regime under the JCPOA, which is a significant verification gain. As of today, the IAEA can confirm that the nuclear-related commitments are being implemented by Iran.”
Not long after our exit, what had become a relatively stable situation escalated into crushing “maximum pressure” U.S. sanctions against Iran. Both Iran and the U.S. seized oil tankers. The United States shot down Iranian drones and sent additional troops to Saudi Arabia. The Strait of Hormuz, the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world, got increasingly confrontational. Plus — big surprise — Iran increased 1) the number of its centrifuges enriching uranium, and 2) its stockpile of low-enriched uranium. < Note: Although low-enriched uranium is used in nuclear power plants, it can also be processed into highly enriched uranium which is used for nuclear weapons. > Soon, Iran had breached the limit on uranium enrichment agreed to under the JCPOA and got a lot closer to obtaining fissile uranium, another ingredient needed for nuclear weapons.
All of these actions helped Iran reduce its breakout time (the time it takes for them to have a nuclear weapon). The scary part is that Iran already knows exactly how to do this. In the 1990s, Iran initiated Project 110, a plan to build five nuclear weapons. They have since abandoned the effort, but it made for one heck of a dry run.
All this madness was before the U.S. drone assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, a senior official of the Islamic Republic of Iran who was close to Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Suleimani was also the commander of the Quds Force, an agency that is part of Iran’s formal military structure and responsible for Iran’s covert military operations. After the attack on Suleimani, Iran immediately said that it was suspending its remaining commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal. They also vowed to abandon the “final restrictions” on uranium enrichment period. Then came the assassination of Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, which Iran responded to with a new law that immediately ramped up of its enrichment of uranium to a level of 20 percent, a level much closer to weapons-grade fuel. The new law also required that international nuclear inspectors be expelled if U.S. sanctions were not lifted.
The whole thing just turned into total chaos, a Trump specialty. Essentially, the Trump administration’s irrational and irresponsible behavior backed Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei into a corner and that is NOT where this needed to go. Now operating alone, the Trump administration tried to unilaterally impose “maximum pressure” against Iran, a strategy that included crippling economic sanctions against the country, individuals, companies, and financial institutions that do business with Iran. The U.S. also designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization and seized cargo from tankers carrying Iranian petroleum.
Without question, U.S. sanctions have had a devastating effect on Iran, but they did not deliver the knockout blow the Trump administration envisioned. At least fourteen banks continued to do business with Tehran. And, unsurprisingly, by mid-April 2021, Iran had announced that it would begin enriching uranium to 60 percent, a level triple the current level.
Another thing the Trump administration naïvely envisioned was being able to control issues within the JCPOA without being a part of it. This led to some embarrassing moments, like in August 2020 when the United States notified the United Nations Security Council that it would invoke a “snapback,” whereby the United Nations sanctions on Iran that were suspended with the signing of the JCPOA would be reinstated.
However, the United Kingdom, France and Germany refused to join the Trump administration in reinstating these sanctions, adding that the United States had no standing to invoke this rule because it was no longer in the JCPOA, a position shared by China and Russia. < Note: China, Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom all remained in the JCPOA. > Earlier that same month, the United Nations Security Council had already rejected an American proposal to extend a five-year ban on the sale of conventional weapons to Iran, highlighting once again how isolated the United States has become on the topic of Iran.
If this episode has taught us anything, it’s that we have to reengage with our global partners to collectively deal with Iran, especially now that Chief Justice Ebrahim Raisi, a conservative hard-liner with an affinity for horrific human rights abuses, is now Iran’s president.
As we negotiate to reenter some form of the JCPOA — which we must do — it is imperative that we also address Iran’s human rights abuses, like the mass arrests of Iranians who peacefully protest the government and the execution of journalist Ruhollah Zam, a dissident journalist who did nothing more than report on the 2017 antigovernment protests in Iran.
We have no time to waste. The Annual Threat Assessment from the U.S. Director of National Intelligence, released on April 9, 2021, warns:
Iran will present a continuing threat to U.S. and allied interests in the region as it tries to erode U.S. influence and support Shia populations abroad, entrench its influence and project power in neighboring states, deflect international pressure, and minimize threats to regime stability. Although Iran’s deteriorating economy and poor regional reputation present obstacles to its goals, Tehran will try a range of tools — diplomacy, expanding its nuclear program, military sales and acquisitions, and proxy and partner attacks — to advance its goals. We expect that Iran will take risks that could escalate tensions and threaten U.S. and allied interests in the coming year.
Iran sees itself as locked in a struggle with the United States and its regional allies, whom they perceive to be focused on curtailing Iran’s geopolitical influence and pursuing regime change.
Tehran’s actions will reflect its perceptions of U.S., Israeli, and Gulf state hostility; its ability to project force through conventional arms and proxy forces; and its desire to extract diplomatic and economic concessions from the international community
With regards to U.S. interests in particular, Iran’s willingness to conduct attacks probably will hinge on its perception of the United States’ willingness to respond, its ability to conduct attacks without triggering direct conflict, and the prospect of jeopardizing potential U.S. sanctions relief.
Regime leaders probably will be reluctant to engage diplomatically in talks with the United States in the near term without sanctions or humanitarian relief or the United States rejoining the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Iran remains committed to countering U.S. pressure, although Tehran is also wary of becoming involved in a full-blown conflict.
Indeed, Iran has been digging a massive tunnel network south of their Natanz nuclear production site, an indication they are constructing new, very deep nuclear facilities designed to survive foreign attacks, including bombs and cyberattacks.
Equally concerning, at the end of 2021, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced that Iran is enriching uranium to 20 percent purity at its Fordow facility, an action that was prohibited by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). By September 2022, the IAEA released a report that says Iran’s uranium at 60 percent is close to 90 percent usable in weapons. This means that Iran has enough uranium near weapons-grade for a nuclear bomb.