RUSSIA
Source: The 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community. January 29, 2019
Russia’s Domestic Politics
The Russian economy’s slow growth and most Russians’ disapproval of government officials’ performance will foster a more challenging political environment for the Kremlin, although its centralized power structure and the resonance of anti-American themes will buoy Putin, sustaining his push for international stature and challenging U.S. global leadership.
We assess that slow growth and depressed wages are eroding the higher living standards that many Russians once saw as Putin’s
greatest accomplishment, and corruption is a major issue that Putin cannot attack because his political system rests on it. Following his support for an unpopular pension reform in 2018, Putin’s public approval fell to levels not seen since before Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. Nevertheless, the Kremlin can rely on its traditional instruments of persuasion to navigate challenges to Putin’s control — including the media and the distribution of financial benefits — and it can turn to its security services to impede protests, crack down on the opposition, and intimidate elites.
Although we judge that Putin and other elites would like to see cooperation with the United States where U.S. and Russian interests overlap, they view publicly blaming the United States for internal challenges as good politics. Moscow believes it can weather the impact of sanctions, and we expect Putin to remain active on the international stage because the public narrative that he has restored Russia’s great-power status remains a pillar of his domestic support.
Global Ambitions
Russia’s efforts to expand its global military, commercial, and energy footprint and build partnerships with U.S. allies and adversaries alike are likely to pose increasing challenges. Moscow will continue to emphasize its strategic relationship with Beijing, while also pursuing a higher profile in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
We assess that Moscow will continue pursuing a range of objectives to expand its reach, including undermining the U.S.-led liberal international order, dividing Western political and security institutions, demonstrating Russia’s ability to shape global issues, and bolstering Putin’s domestic legitimacy. Russia seeks to capitalize on perceptions of U.S. retrenchment and power vacuums, which it views the United States is unwilling or unable to fill, by pursuing relatively low-cost options, including influence campaigns, cyber tools, and limited military interventions.
We assess that Moscow has heightened confidence, based on its success in helping restore the Asad regime’s territorial control in Syria, but translating what have largely been military wins into a workable settlement in Syria will be one of Moscow’s key challenges in the years ahead.
Russia seeks to boost its military presence and political influence in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, increase its arms sales, expand information operations in Europe, and mediate conflicts, including engaging in the Middle East Peace Process and Afghanistan reconciliation.
Military Capabilities
Moscow views military force as key to safeguarding its vital interests and supporting its foreign policy; it is becoming more modernized and capable across all military domains and maintains the world’s largest operational nuclear stockpile.
After decades of increased spending to support modernization, Russia’s defense budget is decreasing to about 3.8 percent of GDP in 2019, from a peak of about 5.4 percent in 2016. Because of momentum in military acquisitions, we judge that the budget is normalizing to pre-peak spending levels.
In 2019, we assess that Russia will continue to modernize the entire military but particularly will make progress in its air defense, submarine, and electronic warfare capabilities.
Russia and Its Neighbors
The Kremlin will seek to maintain and, where possible, expand its influence throughout the former Soviet Union countries, which it asserts are within its sphere of influence.
We assess that a major offensive by either Ukraine or Russian proxy forces is operationally feasible but unlikely in 2019, unless one side perceives the other is seriously challenging the status quo. Bilateral tensions will continue to rise in the Black and Azov Seas as each side asserts its sovereignty and naval capabilities. Russia will continue its military, political, and economic destabilization campaign against Ukraine to try to stymie Kyiv’s efforts to integrate with the EU and strengthen ties to NATO. Russia’s interception of Ukrainian ships in the Kerch Strait and detention of the ships’ sailors in November 2018 demonstrates Russia’s willingness to limit Ukrainian freedom of navigation in the area and exert political pressure on the country’s leadership, particularly in advance of Ukraine’s elections this year.
Ukraine will hold a presidential election in March 2019 and legislative elections in the fall. The large field of presidential candidates, high levels of distrust in political elites, and lack of a clear frontrunner may provide Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko’s rivals, as well as lesser known candidates and political newcomers, an opportunity to appeal to the largely undecided Ukrainian electorate.
Russia is taking steps to influence these elections, applying a range of tools to exert influence and exploit Kyiv’s fragile economy, widespread corruption, cyber vulnerabilities, and public discontent in hopes of ousting Poroshenko and bringing to power a less anti-Russia parliament.
The ruling coalition of Moldova, Ukaraine’s neighbor, is focused on maintaining power in the legislative election planned for February 2019 and probably will seek to limit Russian influence and preserve a veneer of commitment to EU integration.
Tension between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh region remains a potential source for a large-scale military conflict that might draw in Russia.
Russia will continue pressing Central Asia’s leaders to support Russian-led economic and security initiatives and reduce engagement with Washington. At the same time, China probably will continue to expand its outreach to Central Asia, largely to promote economic initiatives because of Beijing’s concern that regional instability could undermine China’s economic interests and create a permissive environment for extremists. Uzbekistan’s political opening under President Shavkat Mirziyoyev will improve prospects for intraregional cooperation, but poor governance and vulnerable economics will raise the risk of radicalization.