top of page

Iran

1787's Plan of Action for Nuclear Defense

Without a doubt, pulling out of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – a landmark deal between Iran and Britain, China, the European Union, France, Germany, Russia and the United States that placed significant restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program – in May 2018 was one of the most irresponsible things Donald Trump did during his first time in office. < Note: China, Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom all remained in the JCPOA. >

For one, leaving the deal made the United States look completely unreliable and put us at odds, yet again, with our European allies. In truth, we looked like total amateurs. But, far worse, it made the entire world much more unstable and vulnerable.

 

President Trump had a huge problem with the deal from the jump, saying things like (this is a direct quote hence the discombobulated wording), “We gave them $150 billion and $1.8 billion and we got nothing... look at what they did to John Kerry and to President Obama.  Look what happened, where they’re bringing planeloads of cash, planeloads, big planes, 757s, Boeing 757s coming in loaded up with cash. What kind of a deal is that?”

This is a total distortion of what happened. When the JCPOA was signed, Iran regained access to its own assets that have been frozen. It’s true that around $1.8 billion was paid to Iran from the U.S. Treasury – and did arrive in Tehran on a cargo plane, in cash – but that was money that the United States already owed Iran (Iran had paid us for military equipment that never was delivered). Still, even if you disagree with the way the Obama administration handled this, it had already happened. The money had already been paid, so why in the world would you blow everything up after the most controversial, hard-to-swallow part of the deal was already in our rearview?

The JCPOA was far from perfect, but the agreement achieved a huge goal: The Iranian government agreed to cut its stockpile to no more than 300kg of low-enriched uranium; promised that it would not enrich any uranium beyond 4 percent and that it would have only one enrichment facility; and, most importantly, Iran agreed to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency access to its nuclear facilities to verify its compliance.

…and despite what the Trump administration claimed, Iran WAS complying with the deal. In May 2018, the very month we pulled out, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that “Iran was subject to the world’s most robust nuclear verification regime under the JCPOA, which is a significant verification gain. As of today, the IAEA can confirm that the nuclear-related commitments are being implemented by Iran.”

Surprising nobody but Donald Trump, not long after our exit what had become a relatively stable situation devolved into a complete mess. The U.S. imposed “maximum pressure” sanctions against Iran. Both Iran and the U.S. seized oil tankers. The United States shot down Iranian drones and sent additional troops to Saudi Arabia. The Strait of Hormuz, the only sea passage from the Persian Gulf to the rest of the world, got increasingly confrontational.

But the worst part was that Iran immediately got back into the nuclear bomb-making business with gusto. Right away, they started digging a massive tunnel network south of their Natanz nuclear production site, an indication they were again constructing very deep nuclear facilities designed to survive foreign attacks, including bombs and cyberattacks.

At the same time, Iran quickly increased 1) the number of its centrifuges enriching uranium, and 2) its stockpile of low-enriched uranium.  < Note: Although low-enriched uranium is used in nuclear power plants, it can also be processed into highly enriched uranium which is used for nuclear weapons. > Not long after, Iran breached the limit on uranium enrichment agreed to under the JCPOA. These actions helped Iran significantly reduce its breakout time, or the time it takes for them to have a nuclear weapon.

This all escalated even further with the U.S. drone assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, a senior official of the Islamic Republic of Iran who was close to its supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Suleimani was also the commander of the Quds Force, an agency that is part of Iran’s formal military structure and responsible for Iran’s covert military operations. After the attack on Suleimani, Iran immediately said that it was suspending its remaining commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal. They also vowed to abandon the “final restrictions” on uranium enrichment period. Then came the assassination of Iran’s top nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, which Iran responded to with a new law that ramped up its enrichment of uranium to a level much closer to weapons-grade fuel. The new law also required that international nuclear inspectors be expelled if U.S. sanctions were not lifted.

The whole thing just turned into total chaos, a Trump specialty. Essentially, the Trump administration’s irrational and irresponsible behavior backed President Hassan Rouhani and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei into a corner and that is not where this needed to go.

Now operating completely alone, the Trump administration tried to unilaterally impose “maximum pressure” against Iran, a strategy that included crippling economic sanctions against the country, individuals, companies, and financial institutions that do business with Iran. The U.S. also designated the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization and seized even more cargo from tankers carrying Iranian petroleum.​ 

 

While the U.S. sanctions had a devastating effect on Iran, they did not deliver the knockout blow Donald Trump envisioned. At least fourteen banks continued to do business with Tehran.

Another thing the Trump administration naïvely envisioned was being able to control issues within the JCPOA without being a part of it. This led to some embarrassing moments, like in August 2020 when the United States notified the United Nations Security Council that it would invoke a “snapback,” whereby the United Nations sanctions on Iran that were suspended with the signing of the JCPOA would be reinstated.​ However, the United Kingdom, France and Germany refused to join the Trump administration in reinstating these sanctions, adding that the United States had no standing to invoke this rule because it was no longer in the JCPOA, a position shared by China and Russia. Earlier that same month, the United Nations Security Council had already rejected an American proposal to extend a five-year ban on the sale of conventional weapons to Iran, highlighting once again how isolated the United States has become on the topic of Iran.

Cut to today. On March 7, 2025, President Trump confirmed he sent a letter to Ayatollah Khamenei offering to reopen negotiations over Iran’s now booming (pun intended) nuclear program – to which Ayatollah Khamenei replied, “Some bullying governments insist on negotiations not to resolve issues but to impose. Negotiation is a path for them to make new demands, it’s not just nuclear issues to speak about the nuclear topic, they are making new demands which will definitely not be accepted by Iran.”

In response, on June 22, 2025, in an attack known as Operation Midnight Hammer, the United States joined Israel’s assault to demolish Iran’s nuclear program, launching a U.S. military strike using B-2 bombers carrying bunker-busting bombs, plus ships launching Tomahawk missiles. The American strikes were the grand finale in Israel’s 12-day war, an attack that included the targeting of Iran’s leading nuclear scientists.

Although it’s impossible to know with certainty the extent of the damage done to Iran’s nuclear program, it is now clear that the destruction fell well short of President Trump’s claim that Tehran’s nuclear program had been “totally obliterated.” He also claimed that, because of the attack, Iran had given up its nuclear ambitions, a dubious claim at best.

The general consensus seems to be that the bombing campaign destroyed only one of Iran’s three principal nuclear facilities, the Fordow site, where B-2 stealth bombers dropped twelve GBU-57 ground-penetrating bombs through ventilation shafts. The intelligence suggests that the attack destroyed thousands of nuclear centrifuges at the deepest levels of Fordow (estimated to be over 250 feet under a mountain), although it’s unclear whether the centrifuges were destroyed or just rendered inoperable.

Although there is ongoing analysis as to the extent of the damage at the other two nuclear enrichment facilities, Natanz and Isfahan, the current assumption is that neither were taken out completely – even though Natanz had been targeted by Israel for days and was finally hit with two Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs.

Regardless, there is little question that the joint U.S./Israeli attack crippled Iran’s ability to make nuclear fuel for some time, mainly since the Fordo facility is widely considered to be Iran’s most advanced and prolific nuclear enrichment site. However, it is also assumed that Iran still has a stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 percent purity (just below the level needed for nuclear weapons), although some of it may be temporarily buried.

Now the question becomes where we go from here. It’s important to remember that Iran’s nuclear capabilities reach much further than Fordo, Natanz and Isfahan and, even though it appears Iran lost a lot of their nuclear scientists in the Israeli 12-day war, they still likely have the knowledge and sophistication to rebuild.

 

This is where true leadership and skilled negotiation must come into play. The world’s tricky nuclear position requires we remain calm and make smart decisions about how to move forward, not hyperventilate and just arbitrarily start pulling the United States out of proven treaties that have taken decades to cultivate – an approach that is amateurish and reeks of fear.

Committing to international nuclear agreements is a no-brainer. Not only do they make us safer, but they can also save us a ton of money by helping us replace the “my bomb is bigger than your bomb” lunacy with “intellect and decent purpose.” Strong global alliances can help us prevent the threat of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon attacks by proliferation, rogue nations, and terrorist organizations. We need to lead a united coalition that penalizes proliferators and ensures multilateral enforcement of those penalties. In fact, preventing this very real threat should be priority one in our dealings with the United Nations and other international bodies.

bottom of page